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voyage specialeinent en vue du transport de passagers
individuels incorpores dans la force armee ennemie;
Considerant qu'il resulte de !'instruction que le vapeur
Federico n'est pas un paquebot faisant regulierement le
transport des voyageurs; que, lorsqu'il a ete capture
en 1ner, il voyageait specialement en vue du transport,
de Barcelone a Genes, de nombreux passagers allemands
~t austro-hongrois, dont la grande majorite appartenaient
par leur age aux classes mo bilisees par leurs gouvernements respectifs et voyageaient pour repondre a cet
appel; que, dans ces circonstances, ces passagers devaient
etre regardes comme incorpores au sens de 1' article 45
precite, et qu'ainsi le navire etait, aux termes dudit
article, pa.ssible de confiscation.
Decision.

DECIDE:

La prise du vapeur espagnol Federico, y compris les
agres, apparaux et accessoires, est declaree bonne et
valable pour la valeur nette en etre adjugee aux ayants
droit, conformement aux lois et reglements en vigueur.
Delibere a Paris, les 15 et 16 mars 1915, ou siegeaient:
MM. Mayniel, president; Rene Worms, Rouchon-Mazerat,
Gauthier, Fuzier, Lefevre et Fromageot, membres du
Conseil, en presence de :h1. Chardenet, commissaire du
Gouvernement.
En foi de quoi la presente decision a ete signee par
le President, le Ra.pporteur et le Secretaire-greffier.
Signe a la minute:
E. MAYNIEL, president;
RENE W ORl\IS, rapporteurJ·
G. RAAB n'OERRY, secretaire-greffier.
Pour expedition conforme:
Le Secre taire-greffier,
G. RAAB n'O:ERRY.
Vu par nons, Co1nmissaire du Gouvernement.

p.

CHARDENET.

THE "ZAMORA."
[PRIVY CouNCIL.]
ON APPEAL :FROM THE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND.

April 7, 1916.
[1916] 2

Statement
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Lord Parker of Waddington, in delivering the considered judgment of the board, said that on April 8,
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1915, the Zamora "\Vas stopped by one of his 1fajesty's

cruisers and 'vas taken to the Orkney Islands and thence
to Barro,v-in-Furness. She was seized as prize in the
latter port on April 19, 1915, and in due course was
placed in the custody of the 1narshal of the prize court.
It was admitted on the one hand that· the copper was
contraband of war, and on the other hand that the steamship was ostensibly bound for a neutral port. On ~{ay
14, 1915, a writ was issued by His Majesty's procurator
general claiming confiscation of both vessel and cargo,
and on June 14, 1915, the president, at the instance of
the procurator general, made an order under Order
XXIX, rule 1, of the prize court rules, giving leave to
the war department to requisition the copper, subject
to an undertaking in accordance with the provisions of
Order XXIX, rule 5. The present appeal 'vas from the
president's order.
It would be convenient first to consider the terms of
Order XXIX. Though the order in terms applied to
ships only, it was by virtue of Order I, rule 2, of the prize
court rules equally applicable to goods. The first rule
of Order XXIX provided that where it was n1ade to
appear to the judge on the application of the proper
officer of the Crown that it 'vas desired to requisition a
ship in respect of which no final decree of condemnation
had been made, he should order that the ship be appraised
and on an undertaking's being given in accordance with
rule 5 of the order the ship should be released and delivered to the Crown. The third rule of the order provided
that where in any case of requisition under the order it
was made to appear to the judge on behalf of the Cro,vn
that the ship was required for the service of his 11:ajesty
forthwith, the judge might order the vessel to be forthwith released and delivered to the Cro,vn 'vithout
appraisement. In such a case the amount payable by
the Crown \Vas to be fixed by the judge under rule 4 of
the order.
rrhe fifth rule of the order provided that in every case
of requisition under the order an undertaking in 'vriting
should be filed by the proper officer of the Cro,vn for
payment into court on behalf of the Crown of the appraised
value of the ship or of the amount fixed under rule 4 of
the order as the case might be, at such time or ti1nes as
the court should declare that the same or any part thereof
was required for the purpose of payment out of court.
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'l'he first observation vlhich their lordships desired to
make on this order was that the provisions of rule 1 \Vere
pri1na facie imperative. 'fhe judge was to act in a certain
way 'vhenever it \Vas 1nade to appear to him that it
'vas desired to requisition the vessel or goods on his
Majesty's behalf. If that were the true construction of
the rule, and the judge was, as a matter of law, bound
thereby, there 'vas nothing more to be said, and the
appeal must fail. If, however, it appeared that the rule
so construed \Vas not, as a matter of law, binding on the
judge, it 'vould have, if possible, to be construed in some
other "ray. Their lordships proposed, therefore, to
consider in the first place whether the rule, if construed as
an imperative direction to the judge, was to any and
what extent binding.
The prize court rules derived their force from orders
of his 1iajesty in council of April 29, 1915. These orders
were expressed to be made under the powers vested in
his Majesty by virtue of the prize court act, 1894, or
otherwise. The act of 1894 conferred on the King in
council power to make rules for the procedure and practice
of the prize courts. So far, therefore, as the prize court
rules related to procedure and practice, they had statutory
force and were undoubtedly binding. But Order XXIX,
rule 1, construed as an imperative direction to the judge,
was not merely a rule of procedure or practice. It
could only be a rule of procedure or practice if it were
construed as prescribing the course to be followed if the
judge was satisfied that according to the law administered
in the prize court the Crown had, independently of the
rule, a right to requisition the vessel or goods, or if the
judge was minded in the exercise of some discretionary
power inherent in the prize court to sell the vessel or
goods to the Cro\VIL
If, therefore, Order XXIX, rule 1, construed as an
iinperative direction, were binding, it must be by virtue
of some po"rer vested in the King in council, otherwise
than by virtue of the act of 1894. It \Vas contended by
the attorney general that the King in council had such
a po,ver by virtue of the royal prerogative, and their
lordships vvould proceed to consider this contention .
King
The idea that the King in council, or indeed any branch
·
of the Executive, had po,ver to prescribe
or ft1ter t h e 1a\V
to be ad1ninistered by courts of la'v in this country \Vas
not in harn1ony \Vith the principles of our constitution.
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It was true that, under a number of modern statutes,
various branches of the Executive had power to n1akc
rules having the force of statutes, but all such rules derived their validity from the statute which created the
power, and not from the executive body by which they
were made. No one could contend that the prerogative
involved any po,ver to prescribe or alter the law administered in courts of common law or equity. It 'vas,
however, suggested that the 1nanner in which prize
courts in this country 'vere appointed and the nature of
their jurisdiction differentiated the1n in this respect
from other courts.
Before the naval prize act, 1864, jurisdiction in mat- u!~
ters of prize 'vas exercised by the High Court of Admiralty
by virtue of a commission under the great seal at the
beginning of each war. The com1nission, no doubt,
o'ved its validity to the prerogative, but it could not on
that account be properly inferred that the prerogative
extended to prescribing or altering the la'v to be administered from time to tin1e under the jurisdiction thereby conferred. The courts of common law and equity in
like manner originated in an exercise of the prerogative.
The form of commission conferring jurisdiction in prize
on the court of admiralty 'vas always substantially the
same. Their lordships 'vould take that quoted by Lord
Mansfield in Lindo v. Rodney (2 Doug. 613) as an example. It required and authorized the court of ad1niralty
u to proceed upon all and all manner of captures, seizures,
prizes, and reprisals of all ships or goods that are or shall
be taken, and to hear and determine according to the
course of admiralty and the law of nations."
If those 'vords were considered there appeared to be
two points requiring notice, and each of them, so far
from suggesting any reason vrhy the prerogative should
extend to prescribing or altering the .la'v to be administered by a court of prize suggested strong grounds why
it should not.
In the first place, all those matters on which the court
was authorized to proceed 'vere, or arose out of, acts
done by the sovereign po,ver in right of "rar. It follo,ved that the King must, directly or indirectly, he a
party to all proceedings in a court of prize. In such a
court his position 'vas in fact the same as in the ordinary
courts of the realm on a petition of right which had been
duly fiated. Rights based on sovereignty were 'vaived

129

Jurtsdtc-

130

INTBRNATIONAL LA"\V: DECISIONS AKD NOTES.

and the Cro,vn accepted for n1ost purposes the position
of an ordinary litigant. .A. prize court must, of course,
deal judicially 'vith all questions which came before it
for determination, and it \Vould be impossible for it to
act judicially if it 'vere bound to take its orders from one
of the parties to the proceedings.
in~~flE:!u~~ In the second place, the la'v which the prize court \Vas
to administer \Vas not the national, or, as it \Vas sometimes
called, the municipal la,v, but the law of nations-in
other words, international la\V. It was worth while
dwelling for a n1oment on that distinction. Of course,
the prize court 'vas a municipal court and its decrees
and orders o'ved their validity to municipal law. The
la'v 'vhich it enforced m.ight, therefore, in one sense, be
considered a branch of 1nunicipallaw. Nevertheless, the
distinction b-etween municipal and international law 'vas
\Veil defined. A court \vhich administered municipal
law was bound by and gave effect to the law as laid down
by the sovereign State which called it into being. It
need inquire only \Vhat that la'v was, but a court which
administered international la'v must ascertain and give
effect to a la \V which was not laid do"'.,.n by any particular State, but originated in the practice and usage
long observed by civilized nations in their relations with
each other or in express international agreement.
It \Vas obvious that, if and so far as a court of prize in
this country was bound by and gave effect to orders of the
l{ing in council purporting to prescribe or alter the international law, it 'vas administering not international
but municipal law; for an exercise of the prerogative
could not i1npose legal obligation on anyone outside the
King's Dominions who 'va.s not the King's subject. If
an order in council were binding on the prize court such
Court might be compelled to act contrary to the express
terms of the comn1ission from which it derived its jurisdiction.
There \vas yet another ~onsidcra tion "rhich pointed to
the same conclusion. 'rhc acts of a belligerent po,ver in
right of war were not justiciable in its O\Vn courts unless
such power, as a matter of grace, submitted to their
jurisdiction. Still less were sueh n.cts justiciable in the
courts of any other po"rer. As \Vas said by ~fr. Justice
Story in the cuse of the Invincible (2 Gall. 43), "acts
done under the authorit~~ of one sovereign can never be
snbj ect to the revision of the tribunals of another sovereign,
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and the parties to such acts n.re not responsible therefor
in their individual capncity." It follo\vecl that, but for
the existence of courts of prize, no one aggrieved by the
acts of a belligerent po'-'rer in tirnes of \Var could obtain
redress other\vise than through diplomatic channels and dr:~lomattc reat a risk of disturbing international amity. An appropriate re1nedy \vas, ho"'never, provided by the fact
that, according to international la\v, every belligerent
power n1ust appoint and sub1nit to the jurisdiction of a
prize court, to \vhich any person aggrieved had access,
and which administered international as opposed to
municipal law-a lavv vvhich vvas .theoretically the same,
whether the court \vhich administered it "ras constituted
under the municipalla\v of the belligerent power or of the
sovereign of the person aggrieved, and \vas equally binding on both parties to the litigation. It ha,d long been
\vell settled by diplomatic usage that, in view of the
remedy thus afforded, a neutral aggrieved by any act of
a belligerent power cognizable in a cotu~t of prize ought,
before resorting to diplomatic intervention, to exhaust
his remedies in the prize courts of the belligerent po'\\rer.
i\.. case for such intervention arose only if the decisions
of those courts \vere such as to amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. It was obvious, ho\vever, that the
reason for that rule of diplomacy "rould entirely vanish
if a court of prize, while nominally administering a law
of international obligation, \vere in reality acting under
the direction of the Executive of the belligerent po\ver.
It could not, of course, be disputed that a prize court,
like any other court, was bound by the legislative enactments of its O\vn sovereign State. A British prize court
would certainly be bound by acts of the imperial legislature. But it was none the less true if the imperial
legislature passed an act the provisions of \Vhich \Vere Nationallaw.
inconsistent \vith the law of nations, the prize court in
giving effect to such provisions \vould no longer he
adn1inistering international la\v. It \Vould in the field
covered by such provisions be deprived of its proper
function as a prize court. Even if the provisions of the
act \Vere merely declaratory of the international la\Y, the
authority of the court as an interpreter of the la\v of
nations would be thereby materially \Veakened, for no one
could say \vhether its decisions were based on a due consideration of international obligations or on the binding
nature of the act itself. The fact, ho,vever, that the
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prize courts in this country would be bound by acts of
the imperial legislature afforded no ground for arguing
that they were bound by the executive orders of the
l(ing in council.
Continuing, Lord Parker said:
In connection 'vith the foregoing considerations, their
Lordships attach considerable importance to the report
dated January 18, 1753, of the committee appointed by
his Britannic Majesty to reply to the complaints of
Frederick II of Prussia as to certain captures of Prussian
vessels made by British ships during the war 'vith France
and Spain, 'vhich broke out in 1744. By way of reprisals
for these captures, the Prussian King had suspended the
payment of interest on the Silesian loan. 'fhe report,
which derives additional authority from the fact that it
'vas signed by ~ir. William Murray, the solicitor general,
afterwards Lord Mansfield, contains a valuable statement as to the la"\v administered by courts of prize. This
is stated to be the law of nations, modified in some cases
by particular treaties. ''If," says the report, ''a subject
of the King of Prussia is injured by or has a demand
upon any person here, he ought to apply to your Majesty's
courts of justice, which are equally open and indifferent
to foreigner or native; so, vice versa, if a subject here is
"\Vronged by a person living in the Dominions of his
Prussian Majesty, he ought to apply for redress in the
King of Prussia's courts of justice. If the rnatter of
complaint be a capture at sea during war, and the question relative to prize, he ought to apply to the judicatures
established to try these questions. The law of nations,
founded upon justice, equity, conscience, and the reason
of the thing, and confirmed by long usage, does not allo'v
of reprisals, except in case of violent injuries directed or
supported by the State, and justice absolutely denied in
re minime dubia by all the tribunals and afterwards by
the prince. When the judges are left free and give
sentence according to their conscience, though it should
be erroneous, that would be no ground for reprisals.
Upon doubtful questions different men think and judge
differently, and all a friend can desire is that justice
should be impartially administered to hiln as it is to the
subjects of that prince in whose courts the matter is
tried." The report further points out that in England
"the Crown never interferes 'vith the course of justice.
No order or intimation is given to any judge." It also
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contains the following state1nent: ".A..ll captures at sea
as prize in time of V\rar must be judged of in the court of
.admiralty according to the la"\v of nations and particular
treaties, if there are any. There never existed a case
where a court, judging according to the la,vs of England
only, took cognizance of prize. * * * It never \Vas
imagined that the property of a foreign subject taken
as prize on the high seas could be affected by la,vs
peculiar to England." This report is, in their lordships'
opinion, conclusive that in 1753 any notion of a prize
court being bound by the executive orders of the Cro"'"n
or having to administ~r 1nunicipal as opposed to international Ia,v, w·as contrary to the best legal opinion of
the day.
The attorney general 'vas unable to cite any case in
V{hich an order of the King in council had as to matters
of la\v been held to be binding on a court of prize. He
relied chiefly on the judgment of Lord Stowell in the case
of the Fox (Edw. 311). The actual decision in this ca.se
was to the effect that there \Vas nothing inconsistent 'vith
the law of nations in certain orders in council made by
way of reprisals for the Berlin and Milan decrees, though
if there had been no case for reprisals, the orders would
not have been justified by international la\v. The decision proceeded upon the principle that where there is
just cause for retaliation neutrals 1nay by the la\v of Retaliatioo .
nations be required to submit to inconvenience fro1n the
acts of a belligerent power greater in degree than Vlould
be justified had no just cause for retaliation arisen, a
principle vvhich had been already laid do\\rn in the Lu cy
(Edw. 122).
The judgment of Lord Sto"\\'"ell contains, ho"~cver, a
remarkable passage quoted in full in the court belo,v,
·w·hich refers to the l{ing in council possessing "legislative
rights" over a court of prize analogous to those possessed onLord
Stowell
prize court
.
by Parliament over the courts of con1mon la,v. At 1nost
this a1nounts to a dictum, and in their lordships' opinion,
with all due respect to so great an authority, the dictun1
is erroneous. It is, in fact, quite irreconcilable 'vith
the principles enunciated by Lord Sto,vell himself. :r..,or
example, in the Jfaria, a s,~.redish ship (1 C. Rob. 340),
his judgment contains the f ollo,ving passage: " 'fhc seat
of judicial authority is indeed locally here in the belligerent country, according to the known la\v and practice of
nations, but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty
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of the person 'vho sits here to determine this question
exactly as he would determine the same question if
sitting at Stockholm, to assert no pretensions on the part
of Great Britain 'vhich he would not allo'v to Sweden in the
same circumstances, and to impose no duties on Sweden
as a neutral country which he would not admit to belong
to Great Britain in the same character." It is impossible
to reconcile this passage with the proposition that the
prize court is to take its law from orders in council.
Moreover, if such a proposition 'vere correct the court
might at any time be deprived of the right which is well
recognized of determining according to law whether a
blockade is rendered invalid either because it is ineffective,
or because it is partial in its operation (see the Franciska,
10 Moore, P. C. 37). Moreover, in the Lucy, above
referred to, Lord Stowell had, in effect, refused to giv-e
effect to the order in council on which the captors relied.
Lord Sto,vell's dictum gave rise to considerable contemporaneous criticism, and is definitely rejected by Sir
R. Phillimore ("Int. La,v," Vol. III., sec. 436). It is
said to have been approved by 1vlr. Justice Story in the
case of Maisonnaire v. Keating (2 Gall. 325), but it will
be found that Mr. Justice Story's remarks, on which
some reliance seems to have been placed by the president
in this case, are directed not to the liability of captors in
their own courts of prize, but to their liability in the
courts of other nations. He is in effect repeating the
opinion he expressed in the case of the Invincible, to which
their lordships have already referred. An act, though
illegal by international law, 'vill not on that account be
justiciable in the tribunals of another power-at any
rate if expressly authorized by order of the sovereign on
whose behalf it is done.
Their lordships have come to the conclusion, therefore 1
that at any rate prior to the naval prize act, 1864, there was
no power in the Crown, by order in council, to prescribe or
alter the law which prize courts have to administer. It
was suggested that the naval prize act, 1864, confers such
and a power. Under that act the court of admiralty became a
permanent court of prize, independent of any commission
issued under the great seal. The act, however, by section
55, while saving the King's prerogative, on the one hand,
saves, on the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court to
decide judicially, and in accordance with international
}a,v. Subject, therefore, to any express provisions con-
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tained in other sections, it leaves matters exactly as they
stood before it was passed. The only express provisions
which confer powers on the King in council are: (1)
Those contained in section 13 (now repealed and superseded by sec. 3 of the prize court act, 1894), conferring a
power of making rules as to the practice and procedure of
prize courts; and (2) those contained in section 53, conferring power to make such orders as may be necessary
for the better execution of the act.
1'heir lordships are of opinion that the latter po,ver
does not extend to prescribing or altering the law to be
administered by the court, but merely to giving such
executive directions as may from time to time be necessary. In all respects material to the present question,
the law therefore remains the same as it '\Vas before the
act, nor has it been affected by the substitution under
the supreme court of judicature acts, 1873 and 1891, of
the high court of justice for the court of admiralty as the
permanent court of prize in this country.
There are two further points requiring notice in this
part of the case. The first arises on the argu1nent addressed to the board by the solicitor general. It may be,
he said, that the court would not be. bound by an order
in council which is manifestly contrary to the established
rules of internationalla\V, but there are regions in '\Vhich nari~~tl~j_n ter
such law is imperfectly ascertained and defined; and,
\Vhen this is so, it "\Vould not be unreasonable to hold that
the court should subordinate its own opinion to the
directions of the executive. This argument is open to
the same objection as the argument of the attorney
general. If the court is to decide judicially in accordance
with what it conceives to be the la"\v of nations, it can not,
~ven in doubtful cases, take its directions from the
Crown, which is a party to the proceedings. It must
itself deter1nine what the la\v is according to the best of
its ability, and its vie,v, with whatever hesitation it be
arrived at, must prevail over any executive order. Only·
in this way can it fulfill its function as a prize court and
justify the eonfidence 'vhich other nations have hitherto
placed in its decisions.
The second point requiring notice is this: It does not
follo"\V that, because orders in council can not prescribe
or alter the la"\v to be administered by the prize court,
such court "\viii ignore them entirely. On the contrary,
it will act on them in every case in which they an1ount to
a, mitigation of the Cro"\vn rights in favor of the enen1y or
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neutral _, as the case n1ay be. As explained in the case of
the Odessa (32 The 1'im(~S I.J. R. 103; [1 916] .A.. C. 14.5), the
Cro,vn's prerogative of bounty is unaffected by the fact
that the proceeds of the Cro\vn rights or Admiralty droits
are now 1nade part of the consolidated fund and do not
replenish the privy purse. Further, the prize court \vill
1
in ~=c 1 f. order take judicial notice of every order in council n1aterial to
the consideration of matters with which it has to deal,
and "ill give the utmost \veight nnd importance to every
such order short of treating it as an authoritative and
binding declaration of la\v. Thus, an order declaring a
blockade \viii prima facie justify the capture and condemnation of vessels attempting to enter the blockaded ports,
but will not preclude evidence to sbow that the blockade
is ineffective, and therefore unlawful .A. n order authorizing reprisals \vill be conclusive as to the facts which are
recited as showing that a case for reprisals exists, and
\viii have due vv-eight as sho\ving what, in the opinion of
His Majesty's advisers, are the best or only means of
n1eeting the emergency; but this will not preclude the
right of any party aggrieved to contend, or the right of
the court to hold, that these means are unla"'"ful, as
entailing on neutrals a degree of inconvenience unreasonable, considering all the circumstances of the case.
Further, it can not be assumed, until there be a decision
of the prize court to that effect, that any executive order
is contrary to law, and all such orders, if acquiesced in
and not declared to be illegal, will, in the course of ti1ne,
be themselves evidence by \Vhich international law and
usage Inay be established. (See vVheaton's "Int. Law,"
4th English Ed., pp. 25 and 26.)
On this part of the case, therefore, their lorqships hold
that Order XXIX, rule 1, of the prize court rules, construed as an i1nperative direction to the court, is not
binding. Under these circun1stances the rule must, if
possible, be construed merely as a direction to the court
· in cases in which it may be deter1nined that, according to
international la\v, the Crown has a right to requisition
the vessel or goods of enemies or neutrals. There is
1nueh to \V~11Tant this construction, for the order in council, by \vhich the prize court rules "rere 1nade, confor1ns
to the provisions of the rules publication act, 1893, and
on reference to that a.ct it \Yill be found inapplicable to
orders in council, the V"alidity of 'vhich depends on an
exercise of the preroga.ti\e. It is reasonable, therefore,
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to assume that the words "or other\\rise," contained in
the order in council, refer to such other powers, if any,
as the Cro,vn possesses of making rules and not to po,vers
vested in the Crown by virtue of the prerogative.
The next question which arises for decision is "\Vhether
the order appealed from can be justified under any power
inherent in the court as to the sale or realization of property in its custody pending decision of the question to
whom such property belongs. It can not, in their lordships' opinion, be held that the court has any such inherent po·w·er as laid do'vn by the president in this case.
The primary duty of the prize court (as indeed of all
courts having the custody of property the subject of
litigation) is to preserve the res for delivery to the persons who ultimately establish their title. The inherent
power of the court as to sale or realization is confined to
cases -w-here this can not be done, either because the res
is perishable in its nature, or because there is some other
circumstance which renders its preservation impossible
or difficult. In such cases it is in the interest of all
parties to the litigation that it should be sold or realized,
and the court will not allow the interests of the real owner
to be prejudiced by any perverse opposition on the part
of a rival claimant. Such a li1nited po\\rer 'vould not Dutyofcourt .
justify the court in directing a sale of the res merely
because it thought fit so to do, or merely because one of
the parties desired the sale or claimed to beco1ne the
purchaser.
It remains to consider the third and perhaps the 1nost sltlOn.
. ~ight to requi difficult question \Vhich arises on this appeal- the
question "rhether the Cro,~.rn has, independently of Order
XXIX, rule 1, any and 'vhat right to requisition vessels
or goods in the custody of the prize court pending the
decision of the court as to their condemnation or release.
In arguing this question the attorney general again laid
considerable stress on the Cro,vn's prerogative, referring
to the recent decision of the court of appeal in this country
re a petition of right (31 The Times L. IL 596; [1915j
3 K. B. 649). There is no doubt that under certain
circumstances and for certain purposes the Cro,vn ma.y
requisition any property 'vithin the realm belonging to
its o'vn subjects. But this right being one conferred
by 1nunicipal la,v is not, as sueh: enforceable in a court
which achnini~ters international law·. 1'he fact, ho,vever.
that the Crow·n possesses such a ri(J'ht in this eountrv
b

·' '
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and that some,vhat silnilar rights are claimed by most
civilized nations, may well give rise to the expectation
that, at any rate in times of "\Var, some right on the part
of a belligerent po"\ver to requisition the goods of neutrals
\Vithin its jurisdiction "\Vill be found to be recognized by
international usage. Such usage might be expected
either to sanction the right of each country to apply in
this respect its o"\vn municipal la,v, or to recognize a
similar right of international obligation.
In support of the former alternative, \Vhich is apparently accepted by Albrecht (" Zeitschrift fur Volkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht," VI. Band, Breslau, 1912),
it may be argued that the mere fact of the property of
neutrals being found within the jurisdiction of a belligerent power ought, according to international law, to
render it subject to the municipal law of that jurisdiction.
The argument is certainly plausible and may in certain
cases and for such purposes be sound. In general,
property belonging to the subject of one power is not
found within territory of another po,ver without the
consent of the true owner, and this consent may well
operate as a submission to the n1unicipal law. A distinction may perhaps be drawn in this respect bet·w·een
property the presence of which within the jurisdiction
is of a per1nanent nature and property the presence of
which 'vithin the jurisdiction is temporary only. The
goods of a foreigner carrying on business here are not in
the same position as a vessel using an English port as a
port of call. Even in the latter case, however, it is
clear that for some purposes, as, for example, sanitary
or police regulations, it would become subject to the lex
loci. After all, no vessel is under ordinary circumstances
under any co1npulsion to come within the jurisdiction.
Different considerations arise with regard to a vessel
brought 'vithin the territorial jurisdiction in exercise
of a right of war. In the latter case there is no consent
of the owner or of anyone whose consent might impose
obligations on the O"\Vner. Nevertheless, even here, the
vessel might 'vell for police and sanitary purposes become
subject to the municipal law. To hold, however, that
it became so subject for all purposes, including the
municipal right of requisition, would give rise to various
anomalies.
The municipalla"\V of one nation in respect of the right
.t o requisition the property of its subjects differs or nuty
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differ from that of another nation. rrhe circumstances
under \Vhich, the purposes for which, and the conditions
subject to \Vhich the right may be exercised need not be
the sa.me. The municipal law of this country does not
give compensation to a subject whose land or goods are
requisitioned by the Crown. The municipal la\v of
other nations may insist on compensation as a condition
of the right. The circumstances and purposes under
and for which the right can be exercised lnay similarly
vary. It would be anomalous if the in tern a tional la vv
by which all nations are bound could only be ·ascertained
by an inquiry into the n1unicipal la,v· which prevails in
each. It \vould be a still greater anoJnaly if in times of
war a belligerent could, by altering his municipalla\v in
this respect, affect the rights of other nations or their
subjects. The authorities point to the conclusion that
international usage has in this respect developed a la\v
of its O\vn and has not recognized the right of each nation
to apply its O\Vn municipal law.
rrhe right of a belligerent to requisition the goods of
neutrals found within its territory, or territory of which
it is in military occupation, is recognized by a number of
writers on international law. It is SOlnetimes referred
to as the right of angary. and is generally recognized as
involving an obligation to make full compensation.
There is, ho\vever, much difference of opinion as to the
precise circumstances under \Vhich and the precise purposes for which it may be la·wfully exercised. It was
exercised by Germany during the Franco-German War
of 1870 in respect of property belonging to British and
.A. ustrian subjects. The German n1ilitary authorities
seized certain British ships and sank them in the Seine.
They also seized certain Austrian roiling stock a.nd u tilized it for the transport of troops and munitions of war.
The German Government offered full compensation, and
its action \Vas not made the subject of diplo1natic protest,
at any rate by Great Britain. In justifying the action
of the military authorities with regard to the British
ships, Count von I3ismarck laid stress on the fact "thnt
a pressing danger \Vas at hand and every other method
of meeting it \vas \Vanting, so that the case \vas one of
necessity," and he referred to Phillimore, "Int. La,v,"
·volume III., section 29. l-Ie did not rely on the lnunicipal la\V of either France or Germany.
59650-24--10
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On reference to Phillimore it \Vill he found that he
limits the right to cases of "clear and overwhelming
necessity." In this he agrees \Vith De ~fartens, \\"ho
~ronks of the right 8Xisting only in cases of "extr~n1c
ncce~sity" ("La'v of Nations," Book ·vr., sec. 7); and 'vith
Ge~~sner, w·ho says the necessity must be real; that there
must be no other 1neans less violent "de sauver l' existence," and that. neither the desirfl to injure the enemy
nor the greatest degree of convenience to the belligerent
is suffieiflnt. ('' Droits des N cutres," p. 1.54, 2d ed ..
Berlin_, 1876.) It is diffieult to see how~ the acts of the
German Government to \vhich reference has been made
come \vithin the litnits thus laid doV\rn. It might have
been eonvenient to Germany and hurtful to France to
sink English vessels in the Seine or to utilize Au~trian
rolling stock for transport purposes, but clearly no extreme necessity involving actual existence had arisen.
1\.zuni, on the other hand (''Droit n1aritime de l'Europe,"
Vol. I., c 3, art. 5). thought that an exercise of the right
would be justified h.v necessity or public utility; in other
words, that a very high degree of convenience to the
belligerent po"rer \vould be sufficient. Gern1any must he
taken to have asserted and England and Austria to have
acquiesced in the latter vie,,~, "rhich is the ·vie\v taken
by Bluntschli ("Droit International," section 795 his)
and in the only British prize decision dealing \vith this
point.
'I'he case to \vhich their lordships refer is that of the
Gvrlew, the ]fagnet, etc., reported in Ste,vart'~ vice
admiralty cases (Nova. Scotia), page 312. 'rhe ships in
question with their cargoes had been seized by the British
authorities as prize in the early days of the \Var 'vith the
'United States of ~t\.mericn. \vhich broke out in 1812, and
had been brought into port for adjudicn,tion. 'fhe
lieutenant governor of the Province and the ad1niral and
com1nander in chief of 1-Iis 1vlajesty's ships on that station
thereupon presented a. petition for leave to requisition
some of the ships and parts of the cargoes pending adj udication. ln his judgment Doctor Croke lays it do'\Vll
that though as a rule the court has no po\ver of selling or
bartering vessels or goods in its custody, prior to adjudication to a.ny departments of His l\~fajesty's service,
nevertheless there may be cases of n~cessity in \vhich the
right of self-defense supersedes and dispenses \Vith the
usual modes of procedure. He held that such a case hnd
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.in fact. nrisen, and accordingly granted the. prayer of the
· petitioJH~rs: (1) J:-ts to certain small urn1s "Yrr.\- mueh and
imn1rdintrh~ nordrd for the defen~e of thr Province";
(2) a,s to c~rtain oak ti1nbers of '"·hich there 'Yn s ''great
"'nnt·'' in His ~Jajesty's naval )"'ard at Halifax: and (3) as
to a Yessel immediately required for use n~ a prison ship.
Thr appraised value of the propc·rty rrquisitioned "-ns in
each ca.sc ordrrcd to he brought into court.
It should br observed that 'vith regard to ships and co~~ds
goods of neutrnls in tho custody of the prize court for
adjudicfltion, there are special reasons ,,~hich render it
reasonable that the belligerent should in n proper case
have the po\\.,.er to requisition them. Thr legal property
or dominion is, no doubt, stiH in the nrutraL but ultimate
condemnation 'vill Yest it in the Cr<nvn, ns from the da,te
of the seizure as prize, and mrarnvhile all beneficial enjoyment is suspended. In cases where the ships or the goods
are required for immediate use, this Inay 'vell entail
hardship on the party- "'ho ultin1a.tely establishes hip,
title. To 1nitigate the hardship in the ca~e of n ship a
custom has arisen of releasing it to the clain1ant on bn.il;
that is, on giving security for the payment of its appraiserl
value. It 1nay \vell he that in practiee this 'va~ never
done "'itbout the consent of the Cro,vn, but ~nch consent
\\~onld not he likely· to he 'vithheld, unles~ the Cr("vn
itself desired to use the ship after condemnation. The
twenty-fifth section of the naval prize act, 1864, no'v
confers on the judge full discretion in thr n1atter. This
being so, it is not unreasonable that th0 Cro\vn on its sjcle
should in a proper case have po\V<:lr to requisition either
vessel or goods for the national safet:1. It rnust bP remembered tha.t the neutral may obtain compensation for
loss suffered by reason of an improper seizure of his vessel
or goods, but the Cro,vn can never obtain compensation
from the neutral in respect of loss occasioned hy a clairn
to release ,vhich ultimately fails.
The power in question \Vas asserted by the United
States of America in the Civil vVar ,vhich broke out in
1861. In the Memphis (Blatchford, 202), in the Ella
Warley (Blatchford, 204), and in the Stephen Hart
(Blatchford, 387), Betts, J., allo,ved the War l)epartnlent
to requisi t.ion goods in the custody of the prize court.
and required for purposes in connection 'vith the prosecution of the war. In the case of the Pe.terhofl (Blntchford,
381) he allowed the vessel itself to be ~i1nilarly requisi-
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tioned by the Navy ])epartmcnt. 'fhe reasons of Betts,
J., as reported, arc not very satisfactory, for they leave
it in doubt " rhether he considered the right he \vas enforcing to be a right according to the municipalla'v of the
United States overriding the international la\Y or to be
a right according to the international la\v. But his
decisions \\rere not appealed, nor does it appear that they
led to any diplo1natic protest.
On 1\farch 3, 1863, after the decisions above referred to,
the United States Legislature passed an act (Congress,
sess. III, c. 86, of 1863) \vhereby it \vas enacted (sec. 2)
that the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War
should be and they or either of them were thereby authorized to take any captured vessel, any arms or munitions
of \Var or other n1aterial for the use of the Government,
and 'vhen the sa1ne should have been taken before being
sent in for adjudication or aftenvards, the department for
vvhose use it vras taken should deposit the value of the
same in the Treasury of the United States, subject to the
order of the court in "rhich prize proceedings 1night be
ta.ken, or if no proceedings in prize should be taken, to
be credited to the Navy Department and dealt with
according to law.
It is in1possible to suppose that the United States
I..Jegislature in passing this act intended to alter or modify
the principles of international la\\t"' in its O\Vn interest or
against the interest of neutrals. On the contrary, the
act must be regarded as embodying the considered opinion
of the United States authorities as to the right possessed
by a belligerent to requisition vessels or goods seized
as prize before adjudication. Nevertheless, their lordships regard the passing of the act as son1cwhat unfortunate from the standpoint of the international lawyer.
In the first place, it seems to cast son1e doubt upon the
decisions already given by Betts, J. In the second place,
it tends to \Veaken all subsequent decisions of the United
States prize courts on the right to requisition vessels or
goods, as authorities on international la\v, for these
courts are bound by the provisions of the act, \Vhether it
be in accordance \Vith international law or otherwise.
In the third place, their lordships arc of opinion that the
provisions of the act go beyond what is justified by
international usage. The right ·to requisition recognized
by international law is not, in their opinion, an absolute
right, but a right exercisable in certain circumstances
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and for certain purposes only. Further, international
usage requires all captures to be brought promptly into
the prize court for adjudication, and the right to requisition, therefore, ought as a general rule to be exercised
only when this has been done. It is for the court and not
the executive of the belligerent State to decide whether
the right claimed can be lawfully exercised in any particular case.
It appears that the British Government, shortly after
the act was passed, protested against the provisions of
the second section. The grounds for such protest appear
in Lord Russell's dispatch of April 21, 1863. The first
is the primary duty of the court to preserve the subject
matter of the litigation for the party who ultimately
establishes his title. In stating it Lord Russell ignores,
and (having regard to the provisions of the section) \vas
probably entitled to ignore, all exceptional cases based
on the right of angary. The second ground is that such a
general right as asserted in the section would encourage
the making of seizures known at the time when they are
made to be unwarrantable by law merely because the
property seized might be useful to the belligerent. This
objection is more serious, but it derives its chief force
from the fact that the right asserted in the section can be
exercised before the property seized is brought into the
prize court for adjudication, and, even 'vhen it has been
so brought in, precludes the judge from dealing judicially
with the matter. If the right accorded by international
law to requisition vessels or goods in the custody of the
court be exercised through the court, and be confined
to cases in which there is really a question to be tried,
and the vessel or goods can not, therefore: be released
forthwith, the objection is obviated.
It further appears that the United States took t.he Angary.
opinion of their O\vn Attorney General on the matter
(lOth vol., Opinions of A. G. of U. S., p. 519), and
were advised that there was no warrant for the section
in internationalla,,r, and that it would not be advisable
to put it into force in cases 'vhere controversy \vas likely
to arise. 'I'he Attorney General did not, any more than
Lord Russell, refer to exceptional cases based on the
right of angary, but dealt only 'vith the provisions of
the section as a whole.
Some stress \Vas laid in argu1nent on the cases cited
in the judgment in the court belo'v upon "·hat is kno,vn
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as "the right of preen1ption," but in their lordships '
opinion these cases have little, if any, bearing on the matter no'v in controversy. The right of preemption appears
to have arisen in the follo,ving manner: According to the
British vie"r of international law, naval stores were
absolute contrabrand, and if found on a neutral vessel
bound for an enemy port \Vere lawful prize. Other
countries contended that such stores \Vere only contraband if destined for the use of the enemy Government.
If destined for the use of civilians they were not contraband at all. Under these circumstances the British
Government, by way of mitigation of the severity of its
Preemption.
own view, consented to a kind of compromise. Instead
of condemning such stores as lawful prize, it bought them
out and out from their neutral O\vners, and this practice,
after forming the subject of many particular treaties, at
last came to be recognized as fully warranted by international law. It was, however, always confined to naval
stores, and a purchase pursuant to it put an end to all
litigation bet,veen the Crown on the one hand and the
neutral owner on the other. Only in cases "\Vhere the
title of the neutral was in doubt and the pro·perty might
turn out to be enemy property was the purchase money
paid into court. It is obvious, therefore, that this
"right of preemption" differs widely from the right to
requisition the vessels or goods of neutrals, which is
exercised 'vithout prejudice to, and does not concl"!J-de
or otherwise affect the question whether the vessel or
goods should or should not be condemned as prize.
to~~~~~lf~. as On the \Vhole question their lordships have come to the
follo,ving conclusion: A belligerent power has by international law the right to requisition vessels or goods in the
custody of its prize court pending a decision of the question whether they should be condemned or released, but
such right is subject to certain limitations. First,
the vessel or goods in question must be urgently required
for use in connection with the defense of the realm, the
prosecution of the war, or other matters involving national security. Secondly, there must be a real question
to be tried, so that it would be improper to order an
immediate release. .A.nd, thirdly, the right must be enforced by application to the prize court, which must
determine judicially whether, under the particular circumstances of the case, the right is exercisable.
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With regard to the first of these lin1itations, their
lordships are of opinion that the judge ought, as a rule,
to treat the statement on oath of the proper officer of the
Crown to the effect that the vessel or goods which it is
desired to requisition are urgently required for use in
connection with the defense of the realm, the prosecution
of the war, or other matters involving national security,
as conclusive of the fact. This is so in the analogous
case of property being requisitioned under the municipal
law (see Warrington, L. J., in the case of In re a Petition
of Right, supra, at p. 666), and there is every reason why
it should be so also in the case of property requisitioned
under the international law. 'rhose who are responsible
for the national security must be the sole judges of what
the national security requires. It would be obviously
und~sirable that such matters should be made the subject
of evidence in a court of law or other\vise discussed
in public.
With regard to the second limitation, it can be best
illustrated by referring to the old practice. The first
hearing of a case in prize was upon .the ship's papers,
the answers of the master and others to the standing
interrogatories and such special interrogatories as might
have been allowed, and any further evidence which the
judge, under special circumstances, thought it reasonable to admit. If, on this hearing, the judge was of
opinion that the vessel or goods ought to be released
forthwith, an order for release would in general be made.
A further hearing was not readily granted at the instance
of the Crown. If, on the other hand, the judge was of
opinion that the vessel or goods could not be released
forthwith, a further hearing would be granted at the instance of the claimant. If the clai1nant did not desire
a further hearing, the vessel or goods would be condemned. This practice, though obviously unsuitable
in many respects to modern conditions, had the advantage of demonstrating at an early stage of the proceedings whether there \vas a real question to be tried,
or whether there ought to be an immediate release of the
vessel or goods in question. In their lordships' opinion
the judge should, before allo,ving a vessel or goods
to be requisitioned, satisfy himself (having regard, of
course, to modern conditions) that there is a real case for
investigation and trial, and that the circumstances are
not such as \Vould justify the immediate release of the
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vessel or goods. The application for leave to requisition
must, under the existing practice, be an interlocutory
application, and, in view of what has been said, it should
be supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy the judge
in this respect. In this manner Lord Russell's objection
as to the encouragement of unwarranted seizures is
altogether obviated.
With regard to the third limitation, it is based on the
principle that the jurisdiction of the prize court commences as soon as there is a seizure in prize. If the
captors do not promptly bring in the property seized
for adjudication, the court will, at the instance of any
party aggrieved, compel them so to do. From the
moment of seizure, the rights of all parties are governed
by international law. It "\Vas suggested in argument
that a vessel brought into harbor for search might, before
seizure, be requisitioned under the municipalla"\v. This
point, if it ever arises, would fall to be decided by a court
administering municipalla,v, but from the point of view
of international law it would be a misfortune if the
practice of bringing a vessel into harbor for the purpose of
search-a practice which is justifiable because search at
sea is impossible under the conditions of modern warfare-were held to give rise to rights which could not
arise if the search took place at sea.
It remains to apply what has been said to the present
case. In their lordships' opinion, the order appealed from
"ras 'vrong, not because, as contended by the appellants,
there is by international law no right at all to requisition
ships or goods in the custody of the court but because the
judge had before him no satisfactory evidence that such
a right was exercisable. The affidavit of the director of
army contracts, follo,ving the words of Order XXIX, rule 1,
merely states that it is desired on behalf of His Majesty
to requisition the copper in question. It does not state
that the copper is urgently required for national purposes.
Further, the affidavit of Sven Hoglund, 'vhich is unans,vered, so far from sho,ving that there '""as any real case
to be tried, suggests a case for immediate release. Under
these circmnstances, the normal course 'vould be to discharge the order appealed from 'vithout prejudice to
another application by the procurator general supported
by proper evidence. But the copper in question has long
since been handed over to the W'"ar department, and, if
not used up, at any rate can not no'v be identified. No
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order for its restoration can therefore be made, and it
would be wrong to require the Government to provide
other copper in its place. Under the old procedure, the
proper course would have been to give the appellant, in
case his claim to the copper be ultimately allo\ved, leave
to apply to the court for any damage he may have
suffered by reason of its having been taken by the Government under the order.
It \Vas, however, suggested that the procedure prescribed by the existing prize court rules precludes the possibility of the court awarding damages or costs in the
existing proceedings. Under the old practice the captors
were parties to every proceeding for condemnation, and
damages and costs could in a proper case have been
a\varded as against them. But every action for condemnation is now instituted by the procurator general on
behalf of the Cro\vn, and the captors are not necessarily
parties. It is said that neither damages nor costs can be
awarded against the Crown. It is not suggested that the
persons entitled to such da1nages or costs are deprived of
aU remedy, but it is urged that in order to recover either
damages or costs, if damages or costs are claimed, they
must themselves institute fresh proceedings as plaintiffs,
not against the Cro\vn, but against the actual captors.
This result \Yould, in their lordships' opinion, be extremely
inconvenient, and "rould entail considerable hardship on
claimants. If possible, therefore, the prize court rules
ought to be construed so as to avoid it, and, in their lordships' opinion, the prize court rules can be so construed.
It will be observed that, by Order I, rule 1, the expression "captor" is, for the purposes of proceedingi' in any
cause or matter, to include ''the proper officer of the
Cro\vn," and "the proper officer of the Cro\vn" is defined
as the King's proctor or other la\v officer or agent authorized to conduct prize proceedings on behalf of the Cro\vn
within the jurisdiction of the court.
It is provided by Order II, rule 3, that every cause de~view
instituted for the condemnation of a ship or (by virtue of
Order I, rule 2) goods shall be instituted in the name of
the Crown, though the proceedings therein may, \Vith the
consent of the Cro\vn, he conducted by the actual captors.
By Order II, rule 7, in a cause instituted against the
u captor" for requisition or damages, the 'vrit is to be in
the form No. 4 of A.ppendix A. 1'his " ·ould appear to
contemplate that an action for damages run be instituted
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against the proper officer of the Crown, an.v argument to
the contrary, based upon the form of 'vrit as originally
framed, being rendered invalid by the alterations in such
form introduced by rule No.5 of the prize court rules under
the order in council dated March 11, 1915. It is not,
however, necessar.y to decide this point.
Order V provides for proceedings in case of failure to
proceed by captors. Under rules 1 and 2, 'vhich contemplate the case of no proceedings having been yet instituted,
the claimant must issue a writ, and can then apply for
relief by 'vay of restitution, with or 'vithout damages and
costs. It does not appear against 'vhom the "\vrit is to be
issued, whether against the actual captors or the proper
officer of the Crown who ought to have instituted proceedings. Under rule 3, however, 'vhich contemplates
that proceedings have been instituted, it is provided that,
if the captors (,vhich, in the case of an action for condemnation, must, of course, mean the proper officer of the
Crown) fail to take any steps within the respective times
provided by the rules, or, in the opinion of the judge, fail
to prosecute with effect the proceedings for adjudication,
the judge may, on the application of a clairnant, order the
property to be released to the claimant, and may make
such order as to damages or costs as he thinks fit. This
rule, therefore, distinctly contemplates that the Cro"~n or
its proper officer Inay be made liable for darrtages or costs.
Neither damages nor costs could be a"rarded against persons who were not parties to the proceedings, and it can .
hardly have been the intention of the rules to make third
parties liable for the default of those who w·ere actually
conducting the proceedings.
By Order VI proceedings rnay be discontinued by
leave of the judge, but such discontinuance is not to
affect the right, if any, of the claimant to costs and damages. This again contemplates that in an action for
condemnation the claimant may have a right to costs
and damages and, as the Crown is the only proper
plaintiff in such an action, to costs and damages against
the Crown.
Order XIII is concerned 'vith releases. They are to
be issued out of the registry and, except in the sL-x cases
referred to in rule 3, only "\Vith the consent of the judge.
One of the accepted cases is when the property is the
subject of proceedings for condemnation-that is, of
proceedings in 'vhich the crown by its proper officer is
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plaintiff, and when a consent to restitution signed by the
captor (again by the proper officer of the Crown) has
been filed. Another excepted case is when proceedings
instituted by or on behalf of the Cro,vn are discontinued.
By rule 4 no release is to affect the right of any of the
<>wners of the property to costs and damages against the
"captor," unless so ordered by the judge. In the cases
last referred to ''captor" must again mean the proper
officer who is suing on behalf of the Crown.
Order XLIV deals with appeals, and provides that in
every case the appellant must give security for costs to
the satisfaction of the judge. In cases of appeals from a
condemnation or in other cases in 'vhich the Cro,vn by its
proper officer 'vould be a respondent, this provision could
serve no useful purpose unless costs could be a'varded in
favor of the Crown, and if costs can be awarded in favor
of, it follows that they can similarly be awarded against
the Cro,vn.
It is to be observed that unless the judgment or order
appealed from be stayed pending appeal, rule 4 of this
order contemplates that persons in whose favor it is
executed will give security for the due performance of
such order as His Majesty in council may think fit to
make. Their lordships were not informed whether such
security was given in the present case.
In their lordships' opinion these rules are framed on the
footing that where the Crown by its proper officer is a
party to the proceedings it takes upon itself the liability
as to damages and costs to which under the old procedure
the actual captors were subject. This is precisely 'vhat
might be expected, for otherwise the rules would tend
to hamper claimants in pursuing the remedies open to
them according to international la,v. The matter is
somewhat technical, for even under the old procedure
the Crown, as a general rule, in fact defrayed the damages
and costs to 'vhich the captors might be held liable.
The common law rule that the Crown neither paid nor
received costs is, as pointed out by Lord ~1acnaghten
in Johnson v. The King (20 The Times L. R. 697; [1904]
A. C. 817) subject to exceptions.
Their lordships, therefore, have come to the conclusion that in proceedings to which, under the new practice, the Crown instead of the actual captors is a party,
both damages and costs may in a proper case be awarded
against the Crown or the officer who in such proceedings
represents the Crown.
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The proper course, therefore, in the present case is to
declare that upon the evidence before the president he
was not justified in making the order the subject of this
appeal and to give the appellants leave in the event of
their ultimately succeeding in the proceedings for condemnation to apply to the court below for such damages,
if any, as they may have sustained by reason of the order
and 'vhat has been done under it.
Their lordships will humbly advise flis Majesty accordingly, but inasmuch as the case put for,vard by the
appellants has succeeded in part only, they do not think
that any order should be made as to the costs of the
appe~.
•
" COMTE DE

S~iET

DE

NAEYER.~'

November 17, 1916.
[1] Entscheidungen des Oberp1·isengerrichts, 209.

Dooision.

In the prize matter concerning the Belgian full-rigged
ship Oon~te de Smet de Naeyer, Antwerp being her home
port, the imperial superior prize court of Berlin, in the
sitting of November 17, 1916, has found as follo\vs:
"As a result of the appeal of the imperial commissary
the decision of the Hamburg Prize Court of l\1ay 20,
1916, is annulled. 'rhe ship is to be condemned. The
claim is refused. 1'he plaintiff must bear the costs of
both instances."
REASONS.

Statement of the
case.

After the capture of Antwerp, along 'vith other Belgian ships lying in that port, the full-rigged ship Oomte
de Srnet de Naeyer was seized by the German military
forces.
The ship 'vas built of steel in 1877 and until 1906 was
used as a freight ship. In the latter year she was acquired by the Belgian company, ".A. ssociation Maritime
Beige, S. A.," of Ant,verp, 'vith a capital of 500,000
francs, the aims and purposes of 'vhich are stated
as follo,vs:
l'armement, !'exploitation, l'affretement, l'achat, la location et vente
de navires a voile et a vapeur et toutes les operations de commerce,
d'industrie et de finances se rattacha.nt a quelque titre que ce soit a la
navigation maritime et fiuviale, etc.
Le ou les navires de la societe pourront etre affectes a l'enseignement professionnel maritime, etc.

